Parliamentary democracy can no longer really be called democratic today.
When it was introduced in 1848, parliamentary democracy still rested on the shared outlook on life of the voters of the time. But was the system itself really democratic back then?
That depends on how you define the term “democratic”. In classical Athens, only a free adult male who was born to an Athenian father and a free Athenian mother was allowed to vote. He had to be at least 18 years old; for some offices a minimum age of 30 applied, such as for the jurors of the boulè. It was a direct democracy: votes were cast by a show of hands. Women, slaves, foreigners, minors and citizens who had temporarily or permanently lost their rights (for example through debts to the city) were not allowed to vote. Even those entitled to vote could not simply vote: you had to have access to the popular assembly, and voting was only allowed there. Space was limited. Out of a population of 30,000 to 60,000 adult male citizens, there was room for about 6,000 people. Anyone who could not be present therefore could not vote either.
In the Netherlands, after the parliamentary system was introduced in 1848, a property-based franchise applied. Only men aged 23 or older who paid a certain amount in direct taxes were allowed to vote. That was about 7 to 12 percent of adult men. It was not until 1917 that universal suffrage for men aged 25 and over came about, and not until 1922 that women were allowed to vote as well. To this day, young adults from the age of 16 are still not allowed to vote in the Netherlands.
Until about 1960 there was “pillarisation” (verzuiling). There were four pillars: the Protestant-Christian, the Roman Catholic, the socialist and the liberal. Each voter voted largely on the basis of faith or worldview. You voted for a party programme that reasonably matched what you felt and thought. Each pillar had its own network of institutions: as a Catholic you went to a Catholic school, sports club, shop and radio broadcaster. Your political party was closely aligned with your worldview.
After the 1960s, people became increasingly individualistic and developed their own views on a wide range of subjects. The parliamentary system, however, did not adapt to this individualisation. To this day, those entitled to vote can only vote for a party representative who champions that party’s programme. This leads to the following structural problems:
1. The free mandate versus the will of the voter
The elected representative has a free mandate. Under Article 67 of the Constitution, Members of Parliament vote “without mandate” (zonder last). They are therefore not bound by the programme or the promises on which they were elected. After the elections, a politician can change position, leave the party or even bring down the coalition without the voter having any say in the matter.
2. Party coercion and parliamentary-group discipline
Although the mandate is formally free, in practice there is strong group discipline. Members of Parliament who depart from the party line too often risk their seat or their political career. The individual representative is therefore often more accountable to the party leadership than to the voters who elected him or her.
3. Bundling of positions (the package problem)
The voter can only choose between complete packages of positions. Someone can, for example, be against the niqab or burqa and think that Muslim newcomers should adapt more, without being in favour of leaving the European Union. Or someone wants more attention for loneliness in the big cities, without therefore being in favour of a stricter abortion policy. The voter is forced to “swallow” positions that he or she does not share.
4. Coalition politics and the role of the formateur
In a system of proportional representation, the election result is rarely decisive. The coalition formation determines the real course. The formateur and informateur (the figures who lead the coalition negotiations) – who are not elected by the people – play a crucial role in determining which promises are kept and which are not. Small parties or even individual Members of Parliament can thereby gain disproportionate influence. The final coalition agreement is often a watered-down compromise that no voter explicitly voted for.
5. Lack of binding instruments for the citizen
Between elections there is no binding instrument to steer things. The Netherlands has no binding referendum at national level. Consultative referendums have been abolished or severely restricted, and petitions or citizens’ initiatives have no binding force. The citizen is thus left on the sidelines for years, even when politics clearly departs from the election promises.
6. The gap between the political class and society
After the end of pillarisation, a professional political class emerged. Many Members of Parliament and ministers have little or no experience outside politics, the civil service or organisations affiliated with politics. This reinforces the feeling that “The Hague” has become a world of its own that is increasingly unrepresentative of the rest of the country, both geographically and culturally.
7. Structural short-term orientation
The system of elections every four years (or sooner) encourages policy that scores politically in the short term. Long-term issues such as demography, pensions, the housing market, defence or climate are therefore drowned out. Structural problems are left unresolved, while every few years the voter is confronted anew with fresh promises.
8. Unequal influence of interest groups and the media
Although formally everyone has one vote, actual influence is unevenly distributed. Well-organised interests – lobbyists, interest groups, employers’ and employees’ organisations – have structural access to ministers and Members of Parliament. The media agenda can strongly steer the political agenda. The ordinary voter does not have that access.
One thing is certain: almost all current political parties use the votes of the voters as it suits them.
The question is therefore justified: how democratic is our parliamentary democracy still, really, at this moment?
Summary
Parliamentary democracy can no longer really be called democratic today. When it was introduced in 1848, the system still rested on the outlook on life of the voters of the time, but it was limited from the outset. In classical Athens, only free male citizens of Athenian descent were allowed to vote, and only if they were present at the popular assembly. Women, slaves, foreigners and minors were excluded. In the Netherlands, a property-based franchise applied after 1848: only 7 to 12 percent of adult men were allowed to vote. Universal male suffrage did not come until 1917, women’s suffrage in 1922. Young people from the age of 16 are still not allowed to vote.
Until about 1960 the system functioned within pillarisation. People voted largely on the basis of faith or worldview, and the parties were closely aligned with their own pillar. After the 1960s, citizens became strongly individualised. The political system, however, did not adapt to this. Voters can still only vote for a party representative who champions a complete party programme. This leads to eight structural problems.
First, the elected representative has a free mandate. Under the Constitution, Members of Parliament vote without mandate. They are not bound by the programme on which they were elected and can change position or leave the party without the voter having any influence over it.
Second, in practice there is strong group discipline. Anyone who departs from the party line too often risks his or her political future. The elected member is therefore often more accountable to the party leadership than to the voters.
Third, the system forces the voter to accept complete packages of positions. Someone can be against the burqa without being in favour of leaving the EU, or want more attention for loneliness without supporting a stricter abortion policy. Yet he or she has to swallow the whole package.
Fourth, in a system of proportional representation the election result is rarely decisive. The coalition formation determines the real course. The formateur and informateur, who are not elected by the people, decide which promises are kept and which are not. The coalition agreement is often a watered-down compromise that no voter explicitly voted for.
Fifth, there is no binding instrument between elections. The Netherlands has no binding referendum. Consultative referendums have been abolished or restricted, and petitions or citizens’ initiatives have no binding force. The citizen is left on the sidelines for years.
Sixth, a professional political class has emerged. Many Members of Parliament and ministers have little experience outside politics or the civil service. This reinforces the feeling that The Hague has become a world of its own, which is geographically and culturally less and less representative of the country.
Seventh, the system of elections every four years encourages a short-term orientation. Politicians focus on measures that score quickly, while long-term issues such as demography, pensions, the housing market, defence and climate are left unresolved.
Eighth, actual influence is unequal. Lobbyists, interest groups and the media have structural access to ministers and Members of Parliament. The ordinary voter does not have that access.
Almost all political parties use the votes of the voters as it suits them.
The question therefore remains justified: how democratic is our parliamentary democracy still, really, at this moment?





